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ABSTRACT
This paper deals with design of the alternative secure Blockchain network
framework to prevent damages from an attacker. The concept of the strategic
alliance of the management is applied on the top of the recent developed
stochastic game framework. This new enhanced hybrid theoretical model has
been developed based on the combination of the conventional game theory,
the fluctuation theory and the  to find bestBlockchain Governance Game
strategies towards preparation for preventing a network malfunction from an
attacker by making the strategic alliance with other genuine miners.
Analytically tractable results for decision making parameters are fully
obtained which enable to predict the moment for operations and deliver the
optimal number of the alliance with other nodes to protect the Blockchain
network. This research helps for whom considers the initial coin offering or
launching new blockchain based services with enhancing the security
features by alliance with the trusted miners within the decentralized network.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The Blockchain network is recently applied in a wide range of services and
applications far beyond cryptocurrencies. Generally, the Blockchain is a distributed
public digital ledger maintained by achieving the consensus among a number of nodes
in a peer-to-peer network [1]. This decentralized peer-to-peer network has a strength
of the blockchain which removes a number of security risks in the centralized
network. Particularly, the verified transaction data is stored in a chain of blocks which
is a basic data structure of the Blockchain, and the chain grows in an append-only
manner with all new verified blocks [2]. The security of the Blockchain has been
achieved through the distributed consensus of miners and this consensus is only
reliable with the assumption that no single miner can hold more than 50 percent of the
network computational power [2] and more than half miners are not aligned under
single control. To gain its profit, the attacker either invests more than 50 percent of
the computational power or governs more than half of the total nodes. If this
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2assumption is broken, the distributed consensus are not valid any longer and it
involves several operations including verifying transactions, disseminating blocks,
and attaching blocks to the blockchain for maintaining this assumption. Although
blockchain records are not unalterable, it could be considered as a secure network [3-
4]. Recent researchers have improved the securities in the protocol levels and some
researches have proposed the new protocol to prevent the 51 percent attack [5-7].
These protocol improvements might prevent the 51 percent attack but most solutions
are limited because the implementations are robust by choosing the boundaries
arbitrarily. Although the BGG is an innovative idea to protect the decentralized
network from the majority attack, it requires to keep certain amount of genuine nodes
for the proper protection of the network.
Because of this reason, alternative way to reserve genuine nodes which is called the
Strategic Alliance for Blockchain Governance Game (SABGG) has been designed
instead of keeping honest nodes by the defender. In this paper, the Strategic Alliance
for BGG is newly proposed. In general, the strategic alliance is an agreement within
two or more parties to pursue a set of agreed upon objectives needed and it has
emerged to solve many company business problems [11]. The concept of the strategic
alliance has been adapted to improve the BGG based network security. Atypical case
that an attacker to trying to build an alternative chains faster than regular miners is
considered [10]. Instead of keeping genuine nodes, the defender (or controller) makes
the agreement with other genuine miners as a strategic alliance member and the
defender requests for taking the alliance action prior an attack happens. The genuine
miners could either accept the request or reject it when other miners receive the
alliance action request. The normal nodes within the strategic alliance members
become reserved genuine nodes for backups if they agrees the alliance at the moment
of the request. It is noted the total number of alliance member may not same as the
actual honest nodes for backup in the BGG. Each request moment of the alliance
action may have different members to accept each request.
Fig. 1. Strategic Alliance for Blockchain Governance Game
The new results of the SABGG are given as joint functionals between two players of
the predicted time of the first observed threshold which is crossing the half of the total
nodes (i.e., 51 percent) along with values of each component upon this time [10].
3The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, a basic model is introduced and the
key technique is preserving the wide generality of our result. Once a corrupted blocks
are generated, the model predicts how many blocks will be generated and the moment
until more than a half nodes are corrupted by an attacker. In other words, the paper
have modeled processes of cumulated corrupted blocks of nodes and weights to
predict both time and size of the nodes which governed by an attacker. The technique
delivers the results under a composition of the operator: R-operator which has been
introduced in some past work of Dshalalow [12-13]. Basically, the initial setup is
same in the BGG [10] except for the security policy. The moment of the decision
making is also analyzed in Section 2. Unlike the BGG model, the SABGG improves
the Blockchain security by alliancing genuine miners instead of keeping honest nodes
by the defender. The framework for setting up the mixed strategic game is provided in
Section 3. The optimal values and the cost of the strategic alliance for the blockchain
governance game are analytically calculated. Lastly, the special case of the SABGG is
introduced in Section 4. The observation process could have the memoryless
properties which implies that a defender (i.e., a blockchain based service provider)
does not spend additional cost of keeping the past information. This implication also
helps the programming implementation of a blockchain based service by reducing the
analysis complexities.
2. S M F B NTOCHASTIC ODEL OR LOCKCHAIN ETWORK
2.1 Basic Stochastic Model
As it mentioned in the previous section, the setup of the basic model is similar as the
BGG model [10]. The antagonistic game of two players (called "Corrupted" and
"Genuine") is provided and players compete to build the blocks either for genuine (or
honest) or corrupted (or false) ones.
     a.s. 2.1V &³ N ß ? œ !  ?  ?  âß! a b a b
4 !
4 ? ! " #4
     a.s. 2.2Z &³ O ß @ œ !  @  @  âß! a b a b
5 !
5 @ ! " #5
are -measurable and -measurable marked Poisson processes with respectiveY Y- K
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Player C builds the blocks with false transactions (e.g., double spending) and Player G
generate the blocks which contain the correct transactions. Both players races to build
their blocks (either genuine or corrupted). The processes  and  are specified by theirV Z
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The game is over when player C beats the game at time  without the strategic>/
alliance with other nodes (i.e., the action of security is executed). With the strategic
alliance,  player C beats the game at time  unless player G beats at  take place> >/ .
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which gives an exact definition of the model observed until  without the strategic>/
alliance action The joint functional of the blockchain network model is as follows:Þ
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This functional will represent the status of attackers and honest nodes upon the exit
time  The latter is of particular interest, we are interested in not only the prediction> Þ/
of catching up the blocks by attackers but also one observation prior to this. The
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3. S A F B G GTRATEGIC LLIANCE OR LOCKCHAIN OVERNANCE AME
3.1 Preliminaries
A two-person mixed strategy game is considered, and the player G (i.e., a defender
who keeps genuine nodes) is the person who has two strategies at the observation
moment, one step before attackers complete to generate alternative chains with
corrupted transactions. Two strategies, (1) doing nothing, whichDoNothing 
implicates that the Blockchain networks are running as usual, and (2) takingAction 
the preliminary action for avoiding attacks by adding genuene nodes, for player G are
considered. The responses of player C would be either "Not burst" or "Burst." The
cost for the strategic alliance is  and the network bursts if the attacks succeed to-a b(
generate alternative blocks. The whole value of the tokens (or coins)  will be lostZ
and this value might be equivalent with the value by ICO (Initial Coin Offering). It
still has the chance to burst even if the defender (or the provider) adds the genuine
nodes by the agreement with the strategic partners. In this case, the cost will be not
only the token value but also the cost for the strategic alliance and the normal form of
games is as follows:
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          . Strategy sets:  
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Based on the above conditions, the general cost matrix at the prior time to be burst
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Table 1. Cost matrix
where  is the probability of bursting blockchain network (i.e., an attacker wins; =a b1
the game) and it depends on the strategic decision of player G (a defender):
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It is noted that the cost for the alliance (i.e., "Action" strategy of player G) should be
better than the other strategy. Otherwise, player G does not have to spend the cost of
the governance. The total number of the alliance nodes  is fixed but the agreement ( F
is uncertain when the alliance is actually requested. Let us consider the average
acceptance rate within the strategic alliance  then the probability of the actual4
agreement  is the binomial distribution and  from (2.43) is determined as follows:F 5(
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The total number of nodes for the strategic alliance  depends on the cost function and(
the optimal number of alliance members  could be found as follows:(‡
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3.2  Strategic Alliance For Blockchain Governance GameÞ
We would like to design the enhanced blockchain network governance that can take
the action at the decision making moment . The governance in the blockchain is>/"
followed by the decision making parameter. It also means that we will not take any
action until the time  and it still have the chance that all nodes are governed by an>/"
attacker if the attacker catches more than the half of nodes at  (i.e., .>  / /" R#˜ ™G "
If the attacker catches the less than half of all nodes at  (i.e., , then> / /" R#˜ ™G "
the defender could take the action to avoid the attack at  The total cost for> Þ/"
developing the enhanced blockchain network is as follows:
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4. S C : M O PPECIAL ASE  EMORYLESS BSERVATION ROCESS
It is assumed that the observation process has the memoryless properties which might
be a special condition but very practical for actual implementation on the Strategic
Alliance for BGG. It implies that the defender (or a service provider) does not spend
additional cost of storing the past information. To build the cost function of the
blockchain governance, we can find explicit solutions of  ;!, :-"  and the moment of
the decision making after finding the first exceed level index , the probability„ /c d
(generating function) of the number of blocks at the moment   >/ ˆ ‰„ ‘C"G/  and
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It is also noted that the formulas (2.11)-(2.14) could be rewritten as follows:
 4.7! ! - - ! !a b a b a b a b a ba b a bCß D œ "  C  "  D œ C † D ß- 1 - 1
    4.8! ! -- -a b a b a ba bC œ "  C ß
    4.9! ! -1 1a b a b a ba bD œ "  D ß
and
 4.10! ! - - ! !! ! - 1 ! !- 1a b a b a b a b a ba b a bCß D œ "  C  "  D œ C † D ß
 4.11! „ ! -! G- ! -a b a b a b ‘ a bC œ C œ "  C ß!
 4.12! „ ! -! K1 ! 1a b a b a b ‘ a bD œ D œ "  D ß!
from (2.35)-(2.43),
 4.13Q Q Qœ † ³ C C ,;< † D D = ß- 1 ! " ! "! !- 1a b a b a b
 4.14Q Q Q! ! ! " ! ! "! !- 1œ † ³ C C ,; † D D = ß! !a b a b a b<
 4.15! ! !œ ³ C ,; D ß- 1 " "! !- 1a b a b a b
 4.16! ! !! " "! !- 1œ † ³ C ,; D ß! !! !- 1a b a b a b
 4.17!" " " " "³ C ,ß D œ C , D ß! ! !a b a b a b a b- 1
 4.18!"! ! " " " "³ C ,ß D œ C , D ß! ! !a b a b a b a b! !- 1
 4.19" ³ ,<ß = œ ß! ! !a b - 1a b a b a b,< =
 4.20"" ³ <ß " œ! !a b -a b a b< Þ
Since, the observation process has the momoryless properties, the process is
exponentially distributed and the functionals from (4.7)-(4.12) are as follows:
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4.1. The Probability Generating Function of /
The  (aka, the ) is the most important factor to beexit index first exceed level index
fully analyzed because the decision factors including the marginal mean of  > ß G/ /"
and  could be calculated easilty if the exit index is fully analyzed. It could beG/"
straight forward once the  is found fexit index rom (2.29)-(2.34), (2.36) and (3.15)-
(3.26):
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In addition, the proof of the calculations from (4.31)-(4.35) could found in Appendix
A.
4.2. The Marginal Means of The Decision Making Parameters
As it is mentioned above, atypical decision making parameters are /ß G  and> ß/"  /
G Þ/"  Although all decision making papameters could be fully analyzed, using the
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marginal mean of the parameters is occasionally more efficient than finding an
explicit PGF of each parameter. The marginal mean of the decision making
parameters could be found as follows:
„ '
'
c d a b a b¹/ œ ß "ß ß "ß " ß`
`
@° ±R
#
1 ,1 2.49
'œ"
„ „ „ „c d c d c da b a bc d> œ >  Y  " ß/" ! " / 2.50
„ „ „ / „ „ / „c d c d c d c d a bc dG œ G l œ G  Ò  "Ó N ß/ / ! 5 4.36
„ „ „c d c d c d a bG F œ G  F ß/ ( / ( 4.37
„ „ „ / „ „ / „c d c d c d c d a bc dG œ G l  " œ G  Ò  #Ó N/ /" ! 5 . 4.38
Recall from (3.2), the probability of bursting blockchain network (i.e., an attacker
wins the game) under the momoryless properties becomes the Poission Compound
process:
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where
„ „ „
- ‘ ” •” •¹ a b"e fG œ5 -  >/ œ † / >>5x/ - /- / 4.40
4.2. Linear Programming Practice
A network security in a semi-public blockchain based service with the token offering
is considered in this subsection. Although the Blockchain network is designed to be
decentralized, the service provider should have some strategy to avoid attacks not only
from outsiders but also from insiders. As it is mentioned, the strategy for managing
the network reliability is the strategic alliance with other trusted miners to give the
less chance that an attacker catches blocks with corrupted transactions. In the view
point of the service planning, this practice is atypical setup of taken offerings. The
example in this paper is targeting 60K users, 1M USD total token values and the cost
of backup nodes for the governance is 0.1 cents per a genuine node for the strategic
alliance (see Table 2):
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Name Value Description
60,000 [User] Total number of the nodes in the network
1,000,000 [USD] (Target) total value of tokens (or coi
R
Z ns) offered by ICO
0.1 [Cents/Member] Cost for reserving nodes (i.e., alliance members) to avoid attacks
0.7 The acceptance rate 
-(
4 for the alliance within members at 
150 [Blocks] Total number of blocks that changed by an attacker at 
50 [Blocks] Nu
>
G > Ð œ !Ñ
N
/"
! !
5 mber of corrupted blocks by an attacker
Table 2. Initial conditions for the cost function
It is noted that the values that decribed above are artificially given only for
demonstration purposes. Since the model has beenStrategic Alliance for BGG 
analytically solved, the values for the cost function and the probability distributions
could be calculated straight forward (see Table 3).
Name Formula Description
(2.16), (3.7) Probability that an attacker catches the blocks more than a half at 
(2.21), (3.7) Proba
; >
;
!
"
/
( bility that an attacker catches after adding reserved nodes
The number of alliance member for blockchain protection
(3.4) The o
(
(

‡ ptimal number of the strategic alliance nodes
(2.47), (3.8) The probability that an attacker is not succeed at 
(3
: >- "" /
Æ (a bTotal .6) The total cost function for the enhanced blockchain network
Table 3. Calculated values from the equations
However, it still requires the software implementation by using a programing
language. Based on the conditions, the LP (Linear Programing) model could be
described as follows:
        Objective 3.9a b
                        min 4.41K œ Æa b a b( Total
        Subject to a b3.4
                        (   à
-
Z †; -
(
(
! a b4.42
                        ( Ÿ àR# a b4.43
From (3.9), the total cost  is as follows:Æa b( Total
Æ (a b a b a bˆ ‰Total œ :  "  :- "  ;  -  Z ; Z † ;( (( (ˆ ‰ a b" " !- -" " 4.44
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µ µ µ µ!Š ‹R# ! 5 !e fa bc d a bc d- „ / - „ /- -! ! ! ! "5x   "† / a b4.46
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As it is mentioned in Table 3, the parameter  is the number of the strategic alliance(
members to protect the network from an attacker. The below illustration in Fig. 2 is
atypical graph of an optimal result by using the Strategic Alliance for Blockchain
Governance Game based on the given conditions (see Table 2). For this example, the
optimal cost is 57.4K USD when the defender reserve the 7,000 alliance members
with the 0.7 acceptance rate of the alliance action request.
Fig. 2. Optimization Example for the Blockchain Governance Game
The moment of requesting the alliance of honest nodes will be the time  when is>/"
one step prior than the time when an attacker catches more than half of the whole
blocks (i.e., ).>/
5. CONCLUSION
This paper is establishing the enhanced theoretical framework of the Blockchain
Governance Game by bring a new concept from the business area. This research
includes the explicit equations for developing a new Blockchain network security to
avoid the majority attack by doing the strategic alliance with other genuine miners.
The main contributions of this research are the proof of the theorem of the Strategic
Alliance for BGG (BGG-2) and the analytic functionals for the decision making
parameters. In addition, the special case also fully analyzed for visualizing the results
even though the setup of the case is artificially built. This research could be an
alternative approach for whom considers the initial coin offering (ICO) or launching
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new Blockchain based services with enhancing the security features by adapting a
strategic alliance. The SABGG is the first extended basic theoretical study from the
BGG and this study could be extended further to various areas including cyber
security, network architecture, service design and IT business model based on the
Blockchain. In addition, further studies about setting up the initial parameters based
on the real measured data could be yet another future research topics.
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